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In brief: South African prisons 
Under apartheid, South African prisons bore 
the imprint of racialised and repressive rule. The 
opportunity for a fundamental re-think of the policy 
framework had to await the establishment of a 
constitutional democracy. Bold efforts at redesigning 
the system of incarceration were put forward, but 
uneven implementation has diluted many of the 
visions set out on paper. Twenty years into the new 
dispensation, South African prisons continue to 
confront a mix of structural fault lines, bureaucratic 
intransigence, resource constraints and a measure of 
political indifference to the plight of prisoners.2  
In 2001 the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee for 
Correctional Services called for an independent 
inquiry in the Department of Correctional Services 
(DCS) on issues of corruption. In 2006, after five 
years of collecting evidence, the Commission 
of Inquiry into Alleged Incidents of Violence or 
Intimidation in the Department of Correctional 
Services (the Jali Commission) declared that the 
department was ‘arguably no longer governable’.3 
The report highlighted a wide range of ailments: 
widespread patterns of corruption in the procurement 
of goods and services and in appointments, 
administrative ineptitude, a routinisation of abuse 
of inmates, widespread sexual violence among 
inmates, gangsterism,4 endemic overcrowding,5 and 
departmental capture by the Police and Prisons Civil 
Rights Union (POPCRU). 
At present the DCS has the capacity to house 
118 441 inmates across 242 correctional facilities.6 
The inmate population has long exceeded capacity. 
The current inmate population of 150 608 shows 
an overcrowding rate of 127%.7 Overcrowding has 
significantly contributed to poor prison conditions 
and human rights standards are frequently infringed 
as a result of the burgeoning numbers of inmates.8 In 
2013, pre-trial persons constituted 32% of the total 
incarcerated population.9 
* Elrena van der Spuy is attached to the Centre of Criminology, 
Faculty of Law at the University of Cape Town. Chloë McGrath 
was a researcher attached to the Centre of Criminology in 2013 
and has been awarded a Fulbright scholarship for post-graduate 
studies from August 2014 onwards.
The establishment of a constitutional democracy in South Africa necessitated widespread institutional reforms 
across state sectors. A key feature of such reforms was the emphasis on oversight and accountability as 
illustrated in reform endeavours pursued in the South African Police Service, courts and prisons. One such 
oversight mechanism – the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services (JICS) – is the subject of this article. 
Drawing on qualitative interviews with people closely involved with the JICS since 1998, this article presents 
‘insider views’ regarding the JICS. We conclude with incumbents’ views on the effectiveness of the JICS.1
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In brief: the Judicial Inspectorate  
for Correctional Services 
The Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services 
(JICS) was established in 1998 and became a fully 
functioning office in 2000. The office is headed up by 
an Inspecting Judge (IJ), who is assisted by a Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), under whom are three units: 
the support services directorate, the legal services 
directorate, and the management regions directorate. 
The CEO must appoint an Independent Correctional 
Centre Visitor (ICCV) for each correctional facility. 
The role of the ICCV is to regularly visit correctional 
centres, interview inmates and record complaints, 
and attempt to resolve complaints with the DCS 
where possible, submitting unresolved complaints to 
the IJ and writing monthly reports to be submitted 
to the IJ’s office.10 Visitors Committees (VC) are then 
established to deal with unresolved complaints, 
schedule visits to correctional facilities, and engage 
with community leaders. The total expenditure of 
the JICS for the 2012/3 year was R31 321 506.67. 
In the 2012/13 year, the ICCVs dealt with 530 183 
complaints across 242 correctional centres.11 
Four key pieces of research12 have evaluated both 
the necessity for and the efficacy of the JICS. While in 
agreement that an independent watchdog to provide 
oversight in South Africa’s correctional centres is 
absolutely necessary, the research has raised serious 
concerns about its functional independence and its 
lack of power to enforce recommendations. While 
the JICS publishes the number of complaints, it does 
not indicate whether these complaints are resolved. 
Furthermore, although the JICS has been highly 
critical of the DCS, its recommendations and findings 
have been largely disregarded by the DCS. 
How do those situated at the upper echelons of the 
JICS reflect on the mandate, role, achievements and 
challenges of this oversight mechanism?
Research methods
This study combined elements of oral history 
methodology with in-depth interviews. The group 
of 15 respondents included two drafters of the 
legislation13 in terms of which the JICS was 
established; six Inspecting Judges,14 a former 
Inspector,15 a former Director and a current CEO,16 
the Head of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 
for the Department of Correctional Services,17 and 
three research experts.18 The choice of participants 
proceeded via purposive sampling so as to include 
all six Inspecting Judges who served terms between 
1999 and 2013, and five others who fulfilled key 
roles in the design and operation of the JICS. Three 
researchers of prisons provided informed comment 
on prison reform. The face-to-face interviews of 
approximately two hours duration each were audio 
recorded and transcribed during the second half 
of 2013. All interviewees consented to having their 
interviews archived in an open access resource.
In the analysis of the interview material we made 
use of a thematic checklist based on the themes 
explored in the interviews. The themes included: 
individual pathways to the Judicial Inspectorate;19 key 
features of South African prisons past and present; 
core components of the JICS; key moments in the 
evolution of the JICS; challenges relating to the 
management of relations and establishing networks; 
and views on the contribution of the JICS to the 
democratic administration of prisons.20  
Key features of prisons past   
and present
We asked JICS incumbents to reflect on key features 
of prisons inherited from the past at the point that 
reconstruction got underway. The responses served 
as a reminder of a deeply racialised system, managed 
along para-military lines, beset by overcrowding and 
overseen by extremely limited forms of oversight. 
Prior to the 1990s, racial segregation in prisons was 
prescribed in legislation and enforced throughout the 
country.21 One of our interviewees, a former political 
detainee, described it as follows:
Prior to 1994 of course the first thing was that 
there was apartheid in prisons. It was very 
strictly applied. Even the police was more kind of 
integrated. In the prison apparatus itself, they were 
very strict. My memory was that all white warders 
outranked all black warders, no matter what levels 
they were at. There were no black warders in my 
white prison. White prisons had beds. At least 
they had mattresses and they had blankets. Black 
prisoners had … well ... not much.22   
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The prison service itself was an extremely 
hierarchical, indeed quasi-military institution. The 
rank structure was modelled on that of an army, and 
a coercive top-down spirit pervaded the nation’s 
prisons. Judge Nathan Erasmus observed that this 
legacy of militarism ‘was a force to be reckoned with’ 
as prison reform got underway.23     
Judge John Trengove, the first Inspecting Judge, 
commented on the horrendous conditions of inmates 
when he took up office as follows: ‘I was shocked 
when I became the Inspecting Judge, with the 
conditions in which people were being held. You 
had cells which were built and had the facilities to 
take about, say, 18 prisoners … where they were 
crammed and had about 60.’24 
Judge Deon van Zyl commented on his own earlier 
experience: ‘In the old dispensation the conditions 
were really not good. Already in those early days, on 
circuit courts I visited prisons. It was quite obvious 
that the cells were hopelessly overcrowded. That’s 
not something of the modern times, that’s something 
that goes back as far as prisons are concerned.’25  
Prior to the introduction of the Bill of Rights and a 
democratic South Africa, some informal oversight 
mechanisms for the treatment of incarcerated 
persons were in place. In 1964, for example, the 
International Red Cross (ICRC) was invited to visit 
South African prisons, and conducted inspections 
across the country, but the report, as is the practice 
of the ICRC, was not made public.26 Furthermore, 
the Prison Regulations of the Republic of South 
Africa extended prison visiting rights to all members 
of parliament regardless of political persuasion, and 
provided access to judges of the Supreme Court to 
any correctional facility in the country. Magistrates 
were given access to prisons within their jurisdiction. 
Judge Hannes Fagan took this duty seriously: 
‘Whenever you went on circuit, you always went to 
the prisons … it was the duty of the judge to go and 
visit prisons … detainees felt that they had nobody 
to talk to and they couldn’t report to anybody.’27  In 
contrast, Judge Vuka Tshabalala reported that in 
his experience judges on the Natal Bench were 
effectively dissuaded from undertaking such visits 
due to concerns for their safety.28 
Several of the respondents recalled human rights 
abuses inflicted on political detainees from the 
1960s onwards. These personal experiences 
during incarceration shaped a deep commitment to 
oversight and accountability among them. As Albert 
Fritz put it: 
We always had the theory that the reason why the 
Mandela regime was so serious about this piece 
of legislation and specially the part that deals 
with the Judicial Inspectorate was because they 
experienced prison life. They know exactly what it 
was and what conditions were on Robben Island 
and they really wanted to get some mechanism 
that was going to be effective.29
The birth of the Judicial Inspectorate 
for Correctional Services
From 1993 onwards, the courts and politicians, with 
a cohort of progressive advisers, began to propose 
sweeping changes regarding incarceration. A ground-
breaking court case, Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr,30  
was the prelude to a human rights regime that 
included the idea that ‘persons incarcerated in prison 
retain all their personal rights save those abridged or 
proscribed by law’.31 
The Interim Constitution explicitly recognised a 
prisoner’s positive rights.32 These rights were later 
entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa of 1996. The idea of an independent 
oversight mechanism for the correctional services 
arose when the Penal Reform Lobby Group (PRLG), 
a conglomeration of civil society lobby groups 
involved in prison reform, spoke out strongly on 
the inadequacy of a 1994 White Paper issued by 
the prisons department.33 The PRLG argued for 
an oversight mechanism and pointed out that, 
without it, the government would be in breach not 
only of the principles set out in the Constitution 
but also of Principle 29(1) of the Principles for the 
Protection of all Persons under any form of Detention 
or Imprisonment, and Rules 55 and 35(2) of the 
UN Standard Minimum Rules For the Treatment of 
Prisoners.34 
Dirk Van Zyl Smit, an academic who had published 
prolifically on prison law and practice in South 
Africa since 1982, was invited by the Commissioner 
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of Correctional Services to advise on the new 
Act. Alongside Van Zyl Smit, drafters Judge Mark 
Kumleben and Advocate Neil Roussouw considered 
the models of independent oversight mechanisms 
in the prison systems of England and Western 
Australia.35 
Van Zyl Smit recounted that the advisers considered 
that the English model was most appropriate for the 
South African context, but proposed two changes. 
They argued that a judge should be the head of the 
institution, based solely on the ‘independence and 
integrity that judges are recognised to have in South 
Africa’.36 In the British system there is both a Prison 
Ombudsman and an Inspector of Prisons. It was 
decided that in the light of resource constraints, these 
should be combined in the single role of the judge 
within the Inspectorate. The inclusion of ‘corrupt and 
dishonest practices’ in the mandate was due to the 
drafters’ conviction that the two were inextricably 
linked.
The JICS was established under section 25 of the 
Amendment Act 102 of 1997 of the Correctional 
Services Act 111 of 1959. The Inspectorate was 
formally established on 1 June 1998, with Judge 
John Trengove as the first Inspecting Judge. The 
Judicial Inspectorate is governed by the provisions 
in Sections 84 to 94 of the Amendment Act. 
These sections were promulgated on 8 February 
1999, according to the proclamation issued by the 
President as provided for in section 138 of the Act.37  
The original mandate of the Inspectorate stated: 
The Judicial Inspectorate of prisons is an 
independent office under the control of the 
Inspecting Judge … The object of the Judicial 
Inspectorate is to facilitate the inspection of prisons 
in order that the Inspecting Judge may report 
on the treatment of prisoners in prisons and on 
conditions and any corrupt or dishonest practices 
in prisons.38
Critical components of the Judicial 
Inspectorate 
Interviewees were asked about the importance 
of various components of the JICS relating to the 
effectiveness of the oversight body. They agreed 
that the critical components of the JICS were the 
Inspecting Judge, the CEO, ICCV and VC, and its 
electronic systems of recording and analysing data. 
The Inspecting Judge
The Judicial Inspectorate is headed by a judge, who 
must be either a Judge of the High Court in active 
service, or a retired judge. In practice the Minister 
of Correctional Services nominates the Inspecting 
Judge to the president, who then makes the final 
appointment.39 Due to the recent creation of the 
position of CEO to replace the former role of the 
director, most participants did not comment at length 
about the impact of the CEO. However, it is clear 
from the data that the administrative function of the 
director and CEO within the JICS has played a critical 
role in operationalising the statutory design of the 
Judicial Inspectorate.
Not all participants agreed that it was necessary 
for a judge to head up the Judicial Inspectorate, 
but there was consensus that the status afforded 
to judges in South Africa was useful in securing 
the statutory endorsed independence (albeit of 
a limited kind) of the Inspectorate. As a former 
Inspector Adam Carelse put it, the Inspecting 
Judge brought ‘independence’ and the notion 
that ‘one must account for one’s actions’. Other 
interviewees commented that in the early phase of 
the Inspectorate’s establishment, the position of the 
judge carried political clout and social prestige. For 
Judge Nathan Erasmus the immunity of his position 
as a judge and the security of a lifetime appointment 
meant that an adversarial approach could be taken 
when necessary. Judge James Yekiso questioned 
the reliance on retired judges and suggested that the 
JICS had to become attractive to judges in active 
service. Others again insisted that the Inspecting 
Judge was only as good as his or her commitment to 
prison reform and the protection of the human rights 
of inmates.
Independent Correctional Centre Visitors
There was broad consensus among those 
interviewed that the Independent Correctional Centre 
Visitor unit is a critical component of the Judicial 
Inspectorate. The role of the ICCV, as set out in the 
Act (S. 93), is to deal with prisoners’ complaints by 
conducting regular visits to the prison, interviewing 
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prisoners in private, recording complaints in an 
official diary and monitoring their progression through 
the reporting system, and discussing complaints 
with the Head of Prison or another internal official 
with the intent of resolving complaints internally 
where possible. Thus, the ICCV is a critical cog 
in the system designed according to the principle 
of procedural justice. It functions via Visitors 
Committees (VC), consisting of independent persons 
from particular areas, which are established by the 
Inspecting Judge. The committees consist of visitors 
from the relevant area.40 The purpose of the VC is 
to address unresolved complaints that have been 
reported to the ICCVs with the intention of bringing 
resolution, and to submit reports with complaints 
that the committee has been unable to resolve to the 
Inspecting Judge.  
The effectiveness of the lay visitor scheme, designed 
with the notion of community involvement in mind, is 
dependent on a range of factors. Viewed collectively, 
interviewees emphasised the importance of selection, 
the speedy appointment of ‘suitable’ lay persons, 
proper training, adequate resourcing, and ongoing 
monitoring of visitors at local and regional levels. 
On these issues respondents concurred with the 
research findings of external assessments of the 
ICCV scheme.41 There was general agreement that 
there was much room for improvement to all of these 
aspects. Chronic problems existed around vacancies, 
further exacerbated by staff turnover. Above all, it was 
emphasised that the effectiveness of an individual 
visitor is largely determined by his or her commitment 
to the human rights of prisoners. As one interviewee 
put it: ‘If the applicant is a mere job seeker, and 
someone who sees this as an opportunity, as a 
stepping stone to something else, then you’re not 
going to get that commitment.’42  
Did ICCVs make a difference to the lives of 
inmates? Here the views differed. Some preferred 
to acknowledge the potential embedded within 
the system of bottom-up oversight, provided that 
issues bedevilling selection through to training and 
monitoring are addressed. Others again had a 
more pragmatic approach – the ‘mere presence’ 
of ICCVs had a ‘restraining’ influence, creating an 
awareness that ‘big brother’ is watching, which in 
itself may act as a deterrent to perpetrators of human 
rights abuses.43 For another interviewee, the small 
contribution that individual ICCVs could make to 
secure, for example, an extra blanket for an inmate, 
should not be scoffed at. As CEO Adam Carelse put 
it: ‘Now, blankets may sound very petty, but if you 
were with me last week in the Free State and it’s 
three degrees, and you sleep under one grey blanket, 
it changes who you are … and in a centre, there’s no 
one to go to beside the ICCV to ensure that you get 
that blanket.’44
Electronic systems
Over the past 20 years of criminal justice system 
reform there has been a considerable investment 
in the modernisation of information systems. In 
2001 the Judicial Inspectorate piloted an electronic 
reporting system. The system was designed to be 
the main portal through which ICCVs and Heads of 
Prisons submitted reports to the Inspecting Judge.45 
The system was linked to cell phones carried by 
the ICCVs and other JICS staff to enable more 
efficient communication. Furthermore, the system 
was programmed to alert members of staff when 
reports were submitted to the JICS concerning 
deaths of inmates, as well as other mandatory 
reporting incidents such as segregation and the use 
of mechanical restraints.46 In addition to creating 
an electronic reporting portal, the new IT system 
also included an automated system for appointing 
ICCVs, which would, according to Gideon Morris, 
‘ensure that the system will run independent of the 
personalities’ and thus ‘eliminate the incidences of 
corruption and nepotism’.47  
However, ten years later the system has not been 
updated. The website that was launched in 2002 
remains the same, and the efficiency of the system 
has been significantly diminished. More tellingly, 
both the website and the domain of the JICS are still 
hosted by the DCS.
Changes in the mandate and   
role of the JICS
The mandate of the Judicial Inspectorate as set out 
in the Act was changed almost immediately after 
the Inspectorate was officially established. At the 
request of Judge Fagan, the Act was amended in 
2001, and the clause concerning ‘corruption and 
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dishonest practices in prisons’ was removed.48 The 
reasons for removing the corruption clause, set out 
in the Annual Report, were that the JICS lacked the 
capacity to track corruption and that the investigation 
of corruption would compromise relations between 
correctional officials and JICS staff. It was argued 
that, given these concerns, corruption should be left 
to an internal unit of the DCS itself. 
Views on the removal of    
the corruption clause
The removal of the corruption clause has been 
controversial, not only in scholarly assessments but 
also within the JICS. The decision to adopt a ‘narrow 
interpretation’ of its mandate has been criticised as 
disregarding the intimate ‘link between corruption 
(i.e. governance) and the treatment of prisoners 
(i.e. human rights)’.49 The original drafters of the Act 
who were interviewed insisted that the inclusion of 
the corruption clause was not an afterthought but a 
calculated measure to remedy what they perceived to 
be an omission in the British system of oversight.50 
Interviewees had divergent views on whether 
corruption should have been retained within the 
mandate. There was, however, agreement that the 
Judicial Inspectorate lacked the capacity to deal 
with corruption. Judge John Trengove, for example, 
acknowledged that while he was acutely aware of 
corruption being rife throughout the ranks of the 
DCS, limited capacity left him with ‘tied hands’. 
Others again emphasised that the very idea of 
investigating corruption was also an ‘uncomfortable’ 
one as it was bound to strain the relationship 
between the JICS and DCS. As another interviewee 
argued:
In Correctional Services the allegations of 
corruption went to all the way to the top … 
how do you investigate and maintain a working 
relationship? It’s very difficult. When you deal with 
lower cases of soft corruption, it’s easy. But when 
it goes up the hierarchy … and then tomorrow you 
have to ask the same people to get your budget. 
It’s not practical.51
As it turned out, various scandals relating to 
corruption made public headlines and then 
culminated in the establishment in 2001 of the Jali 
Commission. Gideon Morris recalls that the JICS 
was given ‘the first bite at the apple’ to investigate 
allegations but that Judge Fagan said, ‘We’ve got so 
much work to do, we don’t have the capacity. I don’t 
want to get involved in that.’52  
The elusive search for independence
A second issue of importance in the evolution of the 
Judicial Inspectorate relates to its independence. 
This matter has been at the centre of the civil society 
debate. Respondents in this study agreed that the 
JICS is not functionally independent of the DCS. 
Financial dependence on the DCS constituted a 
particular hurdle. According to Judge Trengove, ‘as 
far as the prison department was concerned we were 
dependent on them for our finance ... we had to get 
our money from them.’53
Bureaucratisation of systems   
and processes
Lastly, a third issue relates to the inevitable but 
insidious process of bureaucratisation. The routine 
activities of the foot soldiers (in this instance the 
ICCVs recording and reporting complaints) can 
so easily come down to a ticking of boxes on 
standardised templates, which are then fed into the 
administrative machinery of the complaints system. 
More importantly, as interviewees pointed out, lay 
visitors find it immensely difficult to maintain working 
relationships with correctional officials and at the 
same time remain independent in any real sense. It 
is the problem of ‘capture’ that is at stake here.54 As 
Fritz put it, ‘too quickly the independent visitors also 
become institutionalised like the warders’.55
Managing relationships – external 
and internal
The legal mandate of the JICS tells us very little 
about its actual operation. Key social actors (the 
Inspecting Judge, the Minister, the Commissioner 
and senior personnel of the DCS together with heads 
of prisons, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 
and civil society) need to create working relationships 
conducive to the realisation of institutional objectives. 
From the interviews it became apparent that along 
the way different styles of engagement (more or less 
adversarial, more or less cooperative) emerged in 
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response to situational dynamics and the individual 
personalities involved. 
Three sets of relationships were mentioned by 
interviewees. The explicit political relationships 
involve the JICS and the Minister, the JICS and the 
upper echelons of the DCS, and the JICS and the 
Portfolio Committee. The bureaucratic/administrative 
relationships are primarily between the JICS and 
prison management at regional and local levels, and 
within the JICS between the Inspecting Judge, the 
CEO and the ICCVs on the ground. Thirdly, there are 
the social relationships between the JICS and the 
wider public, which respondents also commented 
on as they reflected on the need for establishing 
legitimacy.
Respondents stated that in the early phase of state 
reconstruction the JICS could count on the political 
support of the new government more broadly, and 
the Ministry of Correctional Services more particularly. 
At the time, widespread support for the ethos of 
human rights provided a collective sense of purpose. 
The ‘Robben Island’ experience,56 shared among 
many a cadre of new political figures, brought with 
it a political commitment to the notion of oversight, 
and thus to the objectives of the JICS. Cordial 
working relationships between particular individuals 
(notably Judge Fagan and Deputy Minister Cheryl 
Gillwald) created further conducive circumstances 
for cooperation during the first phase of the JICS, 
but before long the relationships became strained. 
An adversarial relationship between Judge Erasmus 
and Minister Ngconde Balfour was brought to a 
head when Erasmus called in the police to attend to 
corruption in Pollsmoor. The consequent breakdown 
in the relationship between the JICS and the Ministry 
required the new incumbent (Judge Yekiso) to meet 
the Minister, who outlined the judge’s responsibilities 
as set out in the legal mandate and conveyed that 
he would ‘not appreciate any interference in the 
performance of my [Yekiso’s] duties’.57 
The reception at prisons of JICS personnel, recalled 
interviewees, varied from hostile to lukewarm, 
depending on the area. At times, pro-reform elements 
within the ranks of the DCS unexpectedly opened 
up opportunities for engagement. It is in this context 
of ambiguous support that the office and status 
associated with the Inspecting Judge was considered 
a critical factor. Making inroads necessitated 
cooperative strategies, but in other instances the 
need for keeping a respectable distance between the 
JICS and the DCS required something different. Early 
on, recalled one interviewee, a cadre of new leaders 
within the DCS wanted too close a relationship with 
the JICS. They were eager for the JICS to assist with 
the development of departmental policy, training and 
developing ‘appropriate’ budgets. But involvement 
in operational matters had to be resisted so as to 
protect the perceived independence of the JICS.
Making unannounced prison visits was a moot 
point among those interviewed. Some thought it 
was merely a matter of courtesy to announce visits 
beforehand. As one Inspecting Judge put it: ‘I just 
regarded it as a courtesy. For instance I mean I know 
that they want to take a little trouble, to make sure 
that there is some tea and cookies and samosas or 
whatever the case may be.’58 Others again felt that 
announcing visits beforehand was required in order 
to minimise the disruption of routine processes. For 
Adam Carelse, announcing a visit or not was of lesser 
importance. The real issue was to report on what you 
found without fear or favour, and not to feel that you 
had to apologise, as Carelse put it, for saying ‘your 
prison stinks. Just say it as it is. Call them to book. 
But obviously then you need … character. You need 
to be very strong.’59  
Our interviews also explored relationships between 
the JICS and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee. 
Portfolio committees have the potential to fulfil an 
important oversight function. Under the recent 
chairmanship of Vincent Smith, both the DCS and 
JICS were expected to provide quarterly reports to 
the Portfolio Committee. Some of the respondents 
commented in particular about the safety of 
the political space for debate provided by the 
Portfolio Committee as a multi-party structure. The 
sophistication of debate and interaction depends 
very much on the personalities and the commitment 
of key actors, as remarked on by the chair of the 
Portfolio Committee.60  
The quest for managing relationships has lost none 
of its importance. At a meeting of the Portfolio 
Committee in August 2013, the working relationship 
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between the DCS and the Judicial Inspectorate 
featured prominently. The concern related to the 
DCS’s claim of not receiving JICS Reports, and the 
JICS again feeling that its recommendations fell on 
deaf ears. The chairperson, Vincent Smith, injected 
a measure of realism into the discussions. There 
was bound to be tension, he argued, but ‘that need 
not necessarily be destructive. The main issue was 
to ensure that the tension did not bring work to a 
grinding halt.’61  
The contribution of the JICS in   
the greater scheme of things
At the end of our interviews we asked respondents 
for their views on the overall contribution of the 
Judicial Inspectorate to prison administration. 
Roughly speaking, the responses fell into three 
categories. One was a kind of qualified optimism 
about the protection embedded within the 
constitution and the oversight role of the JICS. A 
second was deep pessimism about prison conditions 
and the lack of political commitment to the protection 
of prisoners’ rights. Finally, some respondents 
attempted to balance the positive achievements of 
the JCIS with an admission of the difficulties facing 
the reform of institutions of state.
Judge Fagan’s response to the question regarding 
the overall contribution of the JICS served as a useful 
reminder that the very concept of prison oversight 
itself constituted a radical departure from the previous 
closed system. He also emphasised the rich potential 
for oversight embedded within the institution at that 
early period of operationalisation.
A second category of responses consisted of less 
qualified and more damning responses. Here the 
responses focused on continuities in the system of 
incarceration. For Fritz the traumatic memory of his 
own experience of police detention was evident in 
his response that prisons remain inhospitable spaces 
with cruel power inequalities:
I mean from a substantive point nothing … I 
think very little changed in prisons. Prison is still 
about the things that happen all over: the shouts, 
screams that I heard, that was a police cell, and 
I can imagine what happens in the truck from the 
police cell to the prison and what happened at the 
prison. 
For Judge Erasmus the continuity between then 
and now lies at a deep-seated cultural level where 
inmates continue to be treated as bandiete.62 In 
his view, although many structural changes have 
taken place, the mindset of prison wardens remains 
unchanged. Fritz too pointed out that although the 
demographic and political affiliation of Correctional 
Services staff has changed dramatically with the 
democratisation of South Africa, the attitude towards 
inmates remains hostile and degrading: ‘(There is still 
this attitude that) … a bandiet is a bandiet. He has no 
rights, he’s a criminal.’
A last category of responses we typify as pragmatic 
realism. These responses see some progress, 
but underline the complexities in criminal justice 
reform. Gideon Morris’s response emphasised the 
multifaceted nature of departmental change pursued 
after 1994.
[Currently the Department of Correctional Services] 
operates not because of management but 
despite of management … I think there are some 
serious challenges. But that’s not uncommon in 
government as a whole for now.
Many interviewees stressed the enormity of prison 
reform, and emphasised that issues of overcrowding, 
health, corruption, coercion and sexual violence are 
systemically rooted. 
Conclusion
In search of a retrospective account of the design, 
establishment and operationalisation of the JICS, 
we relied on the stories and recollections of key 
incumbents. Through such stories we hoped to 
breathe additional life into our understanding of 
the way in which structure and agency interact in 
processes of social re-engineering. Insiders spoke 
of both continuities and shifts in the contextual 
challenges they had to negotiate along the way. But 
the stories also served as a critical reminder of the 
force of individual personalities in engaging such 
challenges. 
We were struck by the seriousness and sense of 
purpose exhibited by almost all of the respondents 
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who have helped shape the identity and trajectory of 
the Judicial Inspectorate over the past decade and a 
half. Creating an institution from scratch is rarely easy, 
less so when the institution is charged with powers 
to inspect internal affairs. Closed institutions – such 
as prisons – yield particular challenges to bodies of 
oversight, as the international literature concurs. Such 
challenges multiply where crisis defines the state of 
departmental affairs.
Our own small study leads us to concur with much 
of the recent research literature. Although the JICS 
is widely acknowledged to be an essential institution 
in a democratic South Africa, the role of this 
mechanism of oversight has failed to live up to initial 
expectations. With varying degrees of emphasis, 
these ‘insiders’ appeared aware of the shortcomings 
of the Inspectorate. For those currently involved, it 
is a matter of making the best of a difficult situation 
whose remedy lies quite beyond their powers and 
responsibilities.
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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